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INTRODUCTION

Marketing tax shelters to corporations has become a large and
growing industry.1 Corporate tax shelters generally operate by
* J.D. 2000, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See Stefan F. Tucker, Statement of Stefan F. Tucker on behalf of the
A.B.A. Section of Taxation before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the U.S.
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exploiting discontinuities in the tax law, which treat certain types
of economic activity more favorably than other types.' These
strategies for tax avoidance can save corporations enormous sums
of money by limiting their liabilities. This, however, may come at
the expense of the federal tax base and other U.S. taxpayers? The
government finds the growth of corporate tax shelters troublesome
for reasons beyond the loss of potential revenue in that these
activities engender disrespect for the tax system, and cause the
Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") to waste a significant
amount of resources in combating this problem.4
The overall situation is described as an "audit lottery," in
which corporations engage in tax avoidance transactions, betting
that they will avoid IRS scrutiny; there is much to gain if they win
and relatively little to lose if they do not.' Even if the IRS
eventually disallows a "sham" transaction and levies additional
taxes, the offending corporation benefits in the interim from the
investment use of the withheld funds. Determined to halt this kind
of abuse, the IRS has intensified its efforts to "identify and find
ways to stop transactions which have no real business purpose

House of Representatives on the Subject of Revenue Provisions in the
President's FY2000 Budget, 99 Tax Notes Today 47-65 (Mar. 10, 1999) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX library, TNT file) ("We have witnessed with growing alarm the
aggressive use by large corporate taxpayers of tax 'products' that have little or no

purpose other than reduction of Federal income taxes."); Janet Novack & Laura
Saunders, The Hustling of X Rated Shelters, Forbes, Dec. 14, 1998 at 198
(describing the marketing of tax shelters as a "thriving industry that has received
scant public notice ....).
2. See Dep't of the Treas., The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters:
Discussion,Analysis and Legislative Proposals,July 1, 1999, reprintedin Treasury
White Paperon Corporate Tax Shelters, 99 Tax Notes Today 127-12, 127-13 (July
2, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX library, TNT file) [hereinafter Problem of Corporate
Tax Shelters] (discussing the reasons for some of the discontinuities in the tax

law).
3. See Novack & Saunders, supra note 1, at 202-03 (reporting that Joseph
Bankman, a Stanford Law School professor estimated that the new corporate tax
shelters save corporations up to $10 billion per year in tax breaks).
4.

See Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 2, at para. 9

(discussing the reasons to be concerned about corporate tax shelters).
5. See id. at para. 193 (citing statement of IRS Commissioner Charles
Rossotti).
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other than tax savings." 6
Congress has provided targeted responses that attempt to
abolish specific shelters as they come to light-" however, the
judicially formulated "economic substance doctrine," in
combination with the "business purpose doctrine," is emerging as
the preferred standard for evaluating the legitimacy of a purported
business transaction that functions as a corporate tax shelter!
Preference for this common law doctrine is reflected in a recently
issued Treasury proposal9 which advises Congress that changes to
the substantive law, such as codifying the economic substance
doctrine, are needed to warn corporations about how market
transactions will be scrutinized." The Treasury addressed this, as
well as other generic remedies concerning corporate tax shelters
made by the Clinton Administration, in its Fiscal Year 2000
Budget designed to curb the growth of corporate tax shelters."
The Treasury proposal comes on the heels of several major
IRS legal victories. ' One recent IRS challenge, decided by Tax
Court Chief Judge Mary Ann Cohen, resulted in the case of
6.

Tom Herman, Tax Report,Wall St. J., Oct. 27,1999, at Al.

7. See, eg., I.R.C. § 901(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring a holding
period before corporations can take a foreign tax credit).
& See, e.g., David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic
Substance, 52 Tax Law. 235 (1999) (advocating proper use of the economic
substance doctrine).
9.

Problem of CorporateTax Shelters,supranote 2.

10. Id. at para. 32 (proposing "codification of the economic substance
doctrine" as the "centerpiece" of a change to the substantive law regarding
corporate tax shelters).
11. See id. at paras. 31-35 (summarizing Treasury Department "refinements"
of the Administration's proposals). The Administration's proposal focused on:
"(1) increasing disclosure of corporate tax shelter activities, (2) increasing and
modifying the penalty relating to the substantial understatement of income tax,
(3) changing substantive law to disallow the use of tax benefits generated by a

corporate tax shelter, and (4) providing consequences to all the parties to the
transaction." Id.
12. See, eg., Novack & Saunders, supra note 1, at 208 (noting that recently
companies such as "AlliedSignal, Colgate-Palmolive and Laidlaw have lost court
decisions involving aggressive tax shelters"); Owen Ullman, IRS Hurts Corporate
Schemes, USA Today, April 17, 2000, at 1A (reporting that the Tax Court
recently labeled Winn-Dixie Stores' 1993 corporate-owned life-insurance
program "a sham for tax purposes").
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Compaq Computer Corp. ("Compaq") v. Commissioner." In this
case, the IRS scrutinized a corporate tax shelter in the
international area, and avoided the tax benefits of a dividendstripping transaction designed to yield a foreign tax credit for
Compaq."' The Tax Court upheld the IRS' challenge, disallowing
Compaq's foreign tax credit for withholding taxes paid to the
Netherlands on dividends received, and finding that the American
Depository Receipt ("ADR") transaction at issue was solely taxFollowing the Third Circuit's decision in ACM
motivated."
Partnershipv. Commissioner,'6 the Tax Court reached its decision
using the economic substance and business purpose doctrines to
analyze Compaq's ADR transaction." These two doctrines have
been used in a variety of circumstances to discern the legitimacy of
market transactions. 8
Compaq was decided" in September 1999, approximately two
months after the Treasury's proposal was released. Although the
Tax Court made no specific reference to it, its analysis in Compaq
reflects many of the policies advocated in the Treasury's proposal,
particularly in respect to the use of the economic substance and
business purpose doctrines in identifying corporate tax shelters.
The case therefore provides a useful example by which these
policies can be evaluated.
Compaq illustrates several of the weaknesses in applying the
economic substance and business purpose doctrines to specific
transactions. One weakness is the uncertainty of how much
economic substance a transaction must have in relation to the tax
benefits to withstand judicial scrutiny. Compaq left undefined the

13.
14.

1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44 (Sept. 21, 1999).
See id. at 4-14 (stating findings of fact).

15. See id. at *13. An ADR is a trading unit issued by a trust, representing
ownership of stock in a foreign corporation deposited with the trust. Foreign
stocks are commonly traded through ADRs on U.S. stock exchanges. Id. at *7.
16. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).
17. Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44 at *13-28.
1M See infra Part L.A-B (discussing development of the economic substance
and business purpose doctrines).
19. The Tax Court's holding in Compaq was issued in an opinion to be
"incorporated into the decision of the case when all other issues are resolved."
Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44 at *1.
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level of risk and profit elements that a transaction needs to
withstand judicial scrutiny. A second weakness arises when the
economic substance doctrine is used to challenge transactions that
have been specifically addressed by Congress. Judicial intent to
enlarge the scope of the doctrine to combat corporate tax shelters
may, if uncodified and therefore unchecked, undermine existing
statutory safeguards. If the Tax Court applies the economic
substance doctrine broadly, corporations will be hesitant to engage
even in those transactions that meet U.S. Tax Code ("Code" or
"tax code") specifications. Once it is codified, the doctrine could
have a chilling effect on legitimate market transactions.
This note evaluates the application of the economic substance
and business purpose doctrines to corporate tax shelters through a
discussion of Compaq, and in light of the Treasury's proposed
codification of these doctrines. Part I focuses on the development
of the common law doctrines as well as statutory and
administrative law addressing tax shelters. A brief overview is
given of the Treasury's proposal to combat corporate tax shelters.
Part II reviews the facts of Compaq and the Tax Court's analysis.
Part III offers a critique of the Tax Court's analysis and discusses
its significance in light of the Treasury's report on corporate tax
shelters. Part IV concludes that, while the economic substance and
business purpose doctrines can effectively combat corporate tax
shelters, the Tax Court's case-by-case approach is likely to cause a
chilling effect on legitimate market transactions. This note
recommends that Congress codify the economic substance and
business purpose doctrines as proposed by the Treasury, but with
due regard for their vulnerabilities as discussed herein.
I. LEGAL RESPONSES TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS

Courts have developed and reinterpreted various common law
doctrines to address tax benefits resulting from transactions that
are designed to exploit discontinuities in the Code. Two doctrines
frequently used are referred to as the "economic substance" and
"business purpose" doctrines. Under the economic substance
doctrine, tax benefits may be denied if they "arise from a discrete
set of transactions that do not meaningfully alter the taxpayer's
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economic position."' The business purpose doctrine requires that
a taxpayer have a valid business reason for engaging in the
transaction other than avoiding federal taxes."
In addition,
Congress has passed statutory responses aimed at curtailing
perceived abuses. For instance, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 901(k),
requiring that taxpayers comply with a holding period before they
are eligible to take a foreign tax credit.' Congress also issued
I.R.C. § 6662, which imposes an accuracy-related penalty upon
negligent taxpayers for negligently or substantially understating tax
liabilities beyond the amount of the understatement and interest
due.' Against this background, the Treasury issued the abovementioned proposal to Congress addressing the problem of
corporate tax shelters.
A. Economic Substance Doctrine
The economic substance doctrine derives from a 1935 case,
Gregory v. Helvering, and was recently applied to corporate tax
6
shelters in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner."
The economic
substance doctrine compares the taxpayer's potential to earn a pretax profit with the transaction's anticipated tax benefits.' Other
major decisions applying the economic substance doctrine include
Goldstein v. Commissioner,' Sheldon v. Commissioner," and the
recent Compaq v. Commissioner? The doctrine essentially allows
the IRS to deny tax benefits if the economic substance of a
transaction is insignificant relative to the tax benefits obtained."
In Goldstein, the Tax Court denied the taxpayer's interest

20.
21.
22.

Problemof CorporateTax Shelters, supra note 2, at para. 21.
See id.
See I.R.C. § 901(k).

23.
24.

See I.R.C. § 6662 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).

25.

26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.

See Problem of CorporateTax Shelters, supranote 2.
293 U.S. 465 (1935).
157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).
See Problem of CorporateTax Shelters, supranote 2, at para. 21.
364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), affg 44 T.C. 284 (1965).

94 T.C. 738 (1990).
1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44.
See id. at *15.
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deduction when the taxpayer attempted to use a Treasury Bill
transaction to shelter her sweepstakes winnings.
The scheme
sought to exploit the difference in tax treatment between
borrowing transactions involving prepaid interest and lending
transactions with no prepaid interest.3 The taxpayer planned to
secure a large interest deduction by borrowing money to purchase
Treasury Bills, and then prepaying much of the interest within the
same year.' The effect of the economic loss would be reversed in
later years by interest income and gain on the Treasury Bills26
After analyzing the economic value of the Treasury Bills and loan,
the Tax Court denied the taxpayer's deduction, finding that the
taxpayer had entered into the transaction as a "sham" to produce a
tax benefit, and that the loan by the bank constituted an
investment in Treasury Bills rather than economic exposure to the
taxpayer?6 The decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals 7
In Sheldon, the economic substance doctrine was used to
disallow the tax benefits resulting from a leveraged purchase of
debt instruments.'
The taxpayer bought Treasury bills that
matured shortly after the end of the tax year, and funded the
purchase by borrowing against the Treasury Bills The majority
of the interest deduction on the borrowings was accrued in the first
year, while the taxpayer deferred the offsetting interest income
from the Treasury Bills until the second year.' Similar to the
transaction in Goldstein, the borrowing and lending transactions in
Sheldon economically offset each other, leaving little economic
consequence." The Tax Court in Sheldon denied the taxpayer's
deduction because the transactions had no significant economic
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

44 T.C. at 285-87.
See id. at 286-87.
See id at 287.
See id.at 292-94
See id. at 298-99.
Goldstein v. Commissioner,364 F.2d 734 (1966).
94 T.C. at 759-69.
See id. at 743-45.
See id. at 745.
See Sheldon, 94 T.C. 738, 744-53; supra notes 32-35 and accompanying

text (discussing the Goldstein transaction).
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consequences other than the creation of tax benefits. '2 It also
noted that the potential for small net economic effects could not
support a finding for economic substance.43 According to the Tax
Court, the potential for gain was "nominal" and "insignificant"
when compared to the claimed deduction. '
Recently, in ACM Partnership,'5 the economic substance
doctrine was applied to deny a taxpayer the tax benefits from a
near-simultaneous purchase and sale of property.' In a complex
transaction, the taxpayer purchased privately placed debt
instruments and sold them twenty-four days later for consideration
equal to their purchase price.' Viewed together, the purchase and
sale "had only nominal, incidental effects on ACM's net economic
position."' Despite these minimal economic effects, the taxpayer
claimed the transaction had a large tax effect that resulted when
the installment sale rules were applied.49 The Third Circuit
affirmed the portion of the Tax Court's decision that held the
taxpayer was not entitled to deduct losses resulting from this aspect
of the transaction because it lacked a meaningful economic
consequence other than the creation of tax benefits.'
The
transaction's economic substance was considered in light of the size

42.

See id. at 762.

43.

See id. at 767.

44. Id.
at768.
45. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999) [hereinafter
A CM PartnershipH1].
46. See id.
at 263 (affirming the Tax Court's application of the economic
substance doctrine and its resulting decision to eliminate ACM's capital gains
and losses).

47.

See ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2214

(1997) [hereinafter A CM PartnershipI].
48. ACM Partnership1H,157 F.3d at 250.

49. See ACM Partnership1, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2191. Generally, recovery
of basis and gain recognition occurs in the year of sale. The installment sale rules
defer recovery of basis in the securities sold until each year in which a payment
on the note is received and gain is recognized to the extent a payment exceeds
the basis.
50. See ACM Partnership II, 157 F.3d at 263. The Court of Appeals did,
however, allow deductions for "actual economic losses" that were "economically
substantive." Id.
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of the tax benefit claimed.5' As the Tax Court noted, the briefly
owned debt instruments provided a yield that was only three basis
points higher than a yield that could have been obtained by simply
leaving the taxpayer's money on deposit.n The key inquiry is
whether the taxpayer could have made any economic profit on the
transaction, and as a factual matter, whether the taxpayer engaged
in the transaction in a manner consistent with its stated business
purpose.'
B. Business Purpose Doctrine
The Supreme Court articulated the basics of the business
purpose doctrine in Gregory v. Helveringe as follows:
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what
otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by
means which the law permits, cannot be doubted. But the
question for determination is whether what was done, apart
from tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended."5
Under Gregory, for a transaction to be valid, a business purpose
for engaging in the transaction must exist apart from merely
creating tax benefits.
In ACM Partnership,this inquiry required that the transaction
"be rationally related to a useful nontax purpose that is plausible in
light of the taxpayer's conduct and.., economic situation."' The
business purpose doctrine considers whether the taxpayer acts in a
"realistic and legitimate business fashion," by thoroughly weighing
a questionable transaction before undertaking it.' In Goldstein,
the Seventh Circuit held against the taxpayer because the
borrowing transaction had "no substance of purpose aside from the
51.

See id. at 254-63.

52.

73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2220.

53.

See id. at 2223.

54.

293 U.S. 465 (1935).

55. IdL at 469 (citations omitted).
56. ACM PartnershipI, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2217. See supra notes 46-52
(reviewing factual background of the case).
57. See Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *23 (citing UPS of Am. v.
Commissioner,78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262 (1999).
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taxpayer's desire to obtain the tax benefit of an interest
deduction."'
C. Statutory Responses to PerceivedAbuses
Congress has attempted to abolish some specific tax shelters
by statute. 9 It enacted I.R.C. § 901(k) to prevent taxpayers from
abusing dividend-stripping transactions, by requiring taxpayers to
undergo a predetermined period of risk before they can qualify for
foreign tax credits.'
I.R.C. § 901(k) requires the recipient of a
dividend to hold the stock (or ADR) for at least sixteen days
during a thirty-day period as a prerequisite to claiming a foreign
tax credit for foreign taxes withheld at the source on foreign
dividends." For some preferred stock dividends, the stock must be
held for forty-six or ninety-days.62 If these holding requirements
are not met, the taxpayer may not claim a foreign tax credit against
payable taxes.

Congress has also sought to deter taxpayers from engaging in
inappropriate behavior by imposing penalties. I.R.C. § 6662(a)
imposes an accuracy-related penalty equal to 20% of an
underpayment of federal income tax when the underpayment is
attributable to one or more of the following:
(1) Negligence or disregard of rules or regulations;
(2) Any substantial understatement of income tax;
(3) Any substantial misstatement valuation under Chapter 1
[of the Code];

58. 364 F.2d at 741-42. See supra notes 32-37 (reviewing facts of Goldstein).
59. See Problem of CorporateTax Shelters,supra note 2, at para. 8 (providing
examples of tax shelters shut down by statute).
60. See Kevin M. Keyes, Federal Taxation of Financial Instruments and
Transactions § 2.03(3)(a) (1997). A classic example of a dividend-stripping
transaction is when a corporation buys stock just before a dividend is payable,
then sells the stock once the dividend is received. The desired tax effect of such a
transaction is to incur a capital loss on the sale of the stock.
61. See I.RC. § 901(k)(1).
62- See id. § 901(k)(3).
63. See id. Alternatively, if the foreign tax credit is denied under the holding
rules, the taxpayer may claim a deduction for foreign taxes paid if certain other
requirements are met. See id. § 901(k)(7).
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(4) Any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities;

(5) Any substantial estate or gift tax valuation
understatement."

The Code defines "negligence" as "the failure to make a
reasonable attempt to comply with Code provisions, or the failure
to do what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do
under the same circumstances."'
The penalty's enactment was
motivated by Congress's concern that "an increasing part of the
compliance gap is attributable to taxpayers playing the 'audit
lottery"' by engaging in tax shelter activity.'
D. IRS Response to Foreign Tax Credit Abuses
In 1997, the IRS launched its own attack on what it considered
to be abusive transactions designed to take advantage of foreign
tax credits. It issued Notice 98-5, declaring its intention to issue
new amendments to regulations for the purpose of cracking down
on schemes concocted solely to manufacture qualifying foreign tax
credits.' The amendments are intended primarily to prevent U.S.based multinational corporations from generating excess
limitations by sheltering "low-taxed foreign-source income." from
U.S. tax.69 Although the amendments have not been issued, in
March 2000 the IRS adopted the Notice 98-5 definition of "abusive
arrangements" as transactions subject to the registration and
disclosure requirements of the new temporary regulations
discussed below in Part I.F.
64. Id. § 6662(a)-(b).
65. Id. § 6662(c).
66. Problem of CorporateTax Shelters, supra note 2, at para. 193. Without a
penalty, the taxpayer merely has to pay the tax understatement plus interest.
Meanwhile, the taxpayer had use of the withheld funds.
67. I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334, reprinted in IRS Targets Abusive
ForeignTax CreditSchemes, 97 Tax Notes Today 247-3 (Dec. 24, 1997) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX Library, TNT File).

6& See id. at para. 1 (announcing that the Treasury Dept. and the IRS will
address "abusive tax-motivated transactions" involving foreign tax credits by
issuing new regulations and applying "other principles of existing law").
69. See id. at para. 1.
70. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-15, 2000-12 LR.B. 826, § 4 (stating that
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Notice 98-5 presents a test relying on a comparison of
economic profit and foreign tax credits to challenge sham
transactions conducted after December 22, 1997, the date the
notice was issued to the public."
It identifies as "abusive
arrangements" certain foreign tax credit and cross-border arbitrage
transactions in which the "expected economic profit is insubstantial
compared to the foreign tax credits generated."' An "objective
approach" is to be taken in determining economic profit and
credits for purposes of the regulations to be issued.' This requires
the IRS to consider whether the transaction contained any degree
of risk such that the expected economic profit might not be7 4as
anticipated (including loss exceeding the taxpayer's investment).
E. Treasur Proposalon the Problemof CorporateTax Shelters
On July 1, 1999, the Treasury issued an extensive report
concerning the corporate tax shelter problem, along with
legislative proposals for addressing it, presented as "refinements"
of the Administration's general recommendations.' The report
began with the Administration's conclusion that the current ad hoc
approach must be replaced with a universal solution to check the
growth of corporate tax shelters.76 The Treasury acknowledged
that a balance must be struck between addressing this problem and
hindering otherwise legitimate transactions.7
The Treasury supported an Administration proposal to change
the substantive law to deny corporations the benefit of savings
generated by tax shelters. 8 To accomplish this goal, the Treasury

transactions described in Part II of Notice 98-5 are "tax avoidance transactions"

and are identified as "listed transactions" for purposes of Temp. Treas. Reg.
1.6011-4T (as amended in 2000) and § 301.6111-2T(b)(2) (as amended in 2000)).
71. ld. at paras. 21-30.
72. See id at para. 8-9, 22.
73. See id.
74. See id. ("[T]he determination of economic profit must reflect the
likelihood of realizing both potential gain and potential loss .....
75. Problem of CorporateTax Shelters, supra note 2.
76. See id. at para. 1.
77. See id. at para. 5.
78. See id. at para. 22.
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recommended that Congress codify the economic substance
doctrine as statutory law. The Administration's proposal would
also grant the Secretary of the Treasury "authority to disallow a
deduction, credit, exclusion, or other allowance obtained in a tax
avoidance transaction."s'
The Treasury proposed a two-part definition of a "tax
avoidance transaction.""1 The first part incorporates the economic
substance doctrine, comparing the potential for pretax profits and
expected tax benefits of the transaction.' The second part covers
"transactions involving the improper elimination or significant
reduction of tax on economic income,"' and is meant to apply to
transactions that lack a determinable pretax profit, mainly
financing transactions.'
The Treasury also backed the Administration's proposal that
Congress construct sanctions that penalize all parties involved in a
tax avoidance transaction, including the promoters.' The Treasury
reasoned that the most direct way to curtail the economic incentive
of persons marketing corporate tax shelters is to levy a penalty tax
upon promoters' fees.' This penalty is meant to ensure that "[a]ll
essential parties to a tax-driven transaction.., have an incentive to
make certain that the transaction is within the law."
79. See id. at para. 32 ("The centerpiece of the substantive law change should
be the codification of the economic substance doctrine ...
80. Id. at para. 263.
81. See id. at para. 266.
82.See id.at para. 264. The definition would include:
any transaction in which the reasonably expected pre-tax profit (determined
on a present value basis, after taking into account foreign taxes as expenses
and transaction costs) of the transaction is insignificant relative to the
reasonably expected net tax benefits (i.e., tax benefits in excess of the tax
liability arising from the transaction, determined on a present value basis) of
such transaction.
Id. "Tax benefits" are defined as "a reduction, exclusion, avoidance or deferral
of tax, or an increase in a refund," except for "those benefits that are clearly
contemplated by the applicable [IRC] provision." Id. at para. 265.
83. Id
84. See id. at para. 267.
85. See id. at para. 22.
86. See id. at para. 313.
87. Stefan F. Tucker, Statement of Stefan F. Tucker on behalf of the A.B-A.
Section of Taxation before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the U.S. House of
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Alternatively, the Treasury suggested that Congress could amend
the penalties described in I.R.C. §§ 6700, 6701, and 6703 to address
the heightened marketing activity of promoters.'
The Treasury further proposed that Congress raise and modify
the I.R.C. § 6662 penalty attached to a substantial underpayment
of income tax.89 Despite amendments made in 1994, the penalty
has not been an effective method to prevent the illegal corporate
activity.' The Treasury stated that the current penalty regime does
not effectively deter corporate tax shelter activity because:
(1) the penalty rate is too low (2) taxpayers do not believe the
IRS will assess the penalty (3) the penalty is too easily avoided
by reason of the reasonable cause exception or (4) penalties
alone are not a sufficient deterrent. 9'

Accordingly, the Treasury proposed that Congress raise the I.R.C.
§ 6662 penalty from 20% to 40% of the underpayment.'
F. Temporar Regulations Requiring Disclosureof Tax Shelters
In a major administrative step against the growth of corporate
tax shelters, the Treasury also issued new temporary regulations
that require promoters and taxpayers to disclose and register
potential tax shelters," and force promoters to maintain a list of

Representatives on the Subject of Revenue Provisions in the President's FY2000
Budget, 99 Tax Notes Today 47-65, para. 41 (Mar. 10, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX
library, TNT file). See also Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 2, at
para. 297 ("[Tjhe potential for remedies or sanctions on all participating parties
will multiply the number of eyes that will scrutinize a transaction for its
integrity.").
88. See Problem of CorporateTax Shelters,supra note 2, at para. 314.
89. See id. at para. 22. See also supra notes 64-66 (describing the accuracyrelated penalty).
90. See id. at para. 238.
91. Id.
92. See id. at para. 242.
93. See Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.6011-4T (as amended in 2000) (requiring certain
corporate taxpayers to file a tax shelter disclosure statement with their income
tax return); Temp. Treas. Reg. 3011.6111-2T (as amended in 2000) (requiring
registration of confidential corporate tax shelters).

2000]

CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS

clients for IRS inspection.'
Under the regulations, taxpayers
should disclose once they engage in a transaction that has

attributes typical of abusive tax shelters.'

Promoters should

disclose once they begin promoting tax shelters.' The Treasury
hopes these temporary regulations will make it easier for the IRS
to detect abusive tax sheltersY Furthermore, awareness that
promoters have to maintain lists should deter corporations from
investing in suspect tax schemesY
To make administering these temporary regulations easier, the
IRS opened a new central office, designed to improve coordination
between IRS officials and corporations.' The IRS staffed this
office with examiners specializing in recognizing illegal tax
shelters."
The new IRS office is intended to enhance the
government's ability to recognize tax avoidance transactions and
improve its response time for attacking corporate tax shelters.'

Moreover, corporations

doubtful about

the merits

of a

contemplated transaction may consult IRS specialists in advance
for advice."
94. See Temp. Treas. Reg. 301.6112-IT (as amended in 2000) (requiring
maintenance of lists of investors in potentially abusive tax shelters).
95. See Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.6011-4T(a)-(c). See also John D. McKinnon,
U.S. Sets Tax-Shelter Disclosure Requirements, Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 2000, at A2
("Taxpayers will be required to disclose shelters when the underlying transaction
involves at least two of six criteria that officials say are typical of tax shelters,
including: sheltering of at least $5 million; fees to the promoter of $100,000 or
more; and use of a "straw man" that doesn't gain any tax benefit.").
96. See Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.6011-4T(d) (2000).
97. See CorporateTax Shelter Registration, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,215, 11,215 (2000)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 301, 602) (stating Congress' intent to provide the
Treasury with earlier warning of potential violation of Federal tax law).
9& See McKinnon, supranote 95, at A2.
99. See John D. McKinnon, IRS, Reorganizing, to Sharpen Fight Against
Abusive CorporateTax Shelters,Wall St. J., Feb. 3,2000, at A4 (reporting that the
IRS is establishing a new office "to better coordinate the network of examiners
and specialists responsible for uncovering and closing down illegal tax
schemes .... ").

100. See id.
101. See i. (noting that the new office "is expected to develop a sort of field
guide to tax shelters for examiners").
102. See id. (reporting that the main purpose of the office is to give
corporations guidance on "what constitutes an abusive tax shelter").
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II. COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP. V. COMMISSIONER

Compaq's transaction involved ADRs traded on the New
York Stock Exchange's floor. Initially, the ADR transaction did
not seem unusual because it is quite common; many investors
participate in similar transactions daily. The IRS, however,
charged that Compaq's transaction was actually a strategy
deliberately designed to achieve a specific tax benefit."°3 The Tax
Court found that the transaction was solely tax motivated, thus
precluding Compaq's claim to a foreign tax credit for withholding
taxes paid to the Netherlands on dividends received."'
A. FactualBackground
In 1992, Compaq incurred a large capital gain when it sold its
stock in Conner Peripherals, Inc. ("Connor Peripherals"), a
publicly traded, nonaffiliated computer company."° The next
month, Twenty-First Securities Corporation ("Twenty-First"), an
investment firm, approached Compaq and offered a few strategies
to take advantage of Compaq's capital gain."° A month later,
representatives of Compaq and Twenty-First met to discuss the
strategies." The day after the meeting, Compaq notified TwentyFirst of its decision to engage in an ADR transaction."° This
particular ADR transaction involved the purchase of ADRs before
the dividend record date, cum dividend,"° followed by an
immediate resale of the same ADRs ex dividend. 0
Under a prearranged plan, Compaq purchased Royal Dutch

103. See Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *13-14 (noting the IRS
position that the "ADR transaction had no objective economic consequences or
business purpose other than reduction of taxes.").
104. See id. at 23-24.
105.

See id. at *4.

106.

See id. at *4-5.

107.
108.

See id. at *6.
See id. at *7.

109. See id. at *5. A cum dividend is "a purchase or sale of a share of stock or
an ADR share with the purchaser entitled to a declared dividend." Id.
110. See id. An ax dividend is "the purchase or sale of stock or an ADR share
without the entitlement to a declared dividend." Id.
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Petroleum ADRs from Arthur Gallagher & Company
("Gallagher") on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange."'
Compaq then immediately resold the ADRs back to Gallagher."
The prices paid were predetermined."
Compaq and Gallagher
engaged in 23 of these transactions in just slightly over an hour."
As a result of the transaction, Compaq became the holder of
record when dividends were declared."' The dividend caused the
market value of the ADRs to fall after the record date.
Consequently, Compaq claimed a capital loss that was offset
against its previously realized capital gain.' The dividends paid
were subject to a 15% withholding tax in the Netherlands.'
Compaq simply received the dividend net of the withholding tax
and then claimed a foreign tax credit for the amount withheld.",
Compaq's trades were performed as "cross-trades" which
traders on the floor could wholly or partially break up by bidding
or offering a better price.1 The Tax Court, however, found that
because the cross-trades were valued at the market price, other
parties had no incentive to break up the transaction.' Compaq
had no specific knowledge concerning Royal Dutch," and did not
consult a tax advisor before entering into the transactions. m
Compaq argued that the transactions had economic substance
because a reasonable opportunity for a "pretax profit" existed if
the IRS took into account the gross amount of the dividend.' If
both the foreign tax and the foreign tax credit were excluded from
the calculation, Compaq would similarly have earned a pretax
profit. Compaq argued that "the reduction in income tax received
111.

See id. at *8-9.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. at *9.
See id. at *8.
See id. at *9.
See id. at *ll.
See id. at *12-13.
See id. at *12.
See id. at *12-13.
See id. at *9-10. New York Stock Exchange rules permit certain cross-

trade transactions to be broken up by other traders. See id.
120.
121.

See id.
See id. at *7.

122.
123.

See id. at *28.
Id at *15-18.
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by the United States was not the result of a reduction in income tax
paid by Compaq.""l Compaq also argued that the transaction
satisfied its business purpose of short-term investments undertaken
to make a profit apart from the tax savings.'" Additionally,
Compaq argued that the economic substance doctrine is not
applicable to the foreign tax credit regime." Therefore, Compaq
reasoned, the ADR transaction did not warrant judicial scrutiny
under the doctrine."
The IRS disagreed with Compaq and used the economic
substance and business purpose doctrines to deny Compaq's use of
a foreign tax credit." The IRS disallowed Compaq's foreign tax
credit because it found that the ADR transaction had no objective
economic consequences or a business purpose other than to reduce
taxes.29 Accordingly, the IRS determined that Compaq was liable
for a 20% penalty on its tax underpayment pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 6662(a)."3
The Tax Court ruled in the IRS's favor, upholding its
application of the economic substance and business purpose
doctrines.3 ' The court summarized its conclusion as follows:
Every aspect of [Compaq's] ADR transaction was deliberately
predetermined and designed by [Compaq] and Twenty-First to
yield a specific result and to eliminate all economic risks and
influences from outside market forces on the purchases and

sales in the ADR transaction. [Compaq] had no reasonable
possibility of a profit from the ADR transaction without the
anticipated Federal income tax consequences.1

In addition to disallowing Compaq's foreign tax credit, the
court also upheld the IRS' application of the 20% accuracy-related

124.

I

125.

See id at *23.

at *17.

126.
127.

See id. at *24.
See id.

128.

See id at *22-25.

129.

See id at *13.

130. See id at *26. See also supra notes 64-66 (explaining the accuracy-related
penalty under IRC § 6662).
131. See id at *24.
132.

Id at 13.
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penalty on the grounds of negligence.'
B. Tax Court's Use of the Economic Substance Doctrine
The Tax Court first considered whether Compaq's purchase
and resale of the ADRs had economic substance.' Under this line
of analysis, the transaction must have an objective economic
consequence or business purpose other than to reduce taxes.' The
court stated that only transactions with economic substancecompelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities
imbued with tax-independent considerations and not shaped solely
by tax-avoidance features-will be respected. ' It distinguished
cases where taxpayers were "closing out a real economic loss in
order to minimize taxes or arranging a contemplated business
transaction in a tax-advantaged manner" from cases where they
"enter[ed] into a prearranged loss transaction designed solely for
the reduction of taxes on unrelated income."'
It cited ACM
Partnershipas within the latter category. '
1. PotentialFora Pretax Profit
Having stated the principles underlying the economic
substance doctrine, the Tax Court applied those principles to the
ADR transaction. 9 When analyzing the fairness of alloving
Compaq to take the foreign credit resulting from this ADR
transaction, the court focused on the transaction's U.S. tax
consequences rather than taking a worldwide perspective."0
First, the court reviewed Compaq's arguments claiming that
the transaction had economic substance."' Compaq tried to justify

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
13&
139.
140.
profit).

141.

See id at *28.
See id.at *3.
See id. at *13-14.
See idat *14.
Id.
See id at *14-15.
See id. at *19-24.
See id at *19-20 (using the net dividend received to calculate the pretax

See id. at *15-19.
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its ADR transaction by stating that it enjoyed neither a tax
reduction nor tax benefit from the transaction. 4 Compaq argued
that its taxable income increased by approximately $1.9 million$22,546,800 of dividend income less a $20,652,816 capital loss-due
to arbitrage of the Royal Dutch ADRs' 3 Furthermore, Compaq's
worldwide tax liability increased by more than $640,000-its
estimated U.S. income tax based on $1.9 million in income1""
Compaq argued that this increase in income taxes occurred
because Compaq realized a net profit on the transaction.4 The
court countered Compaq's argument, stating that if it followed
Compaq's logic, the company would have paid $4 million in
worldwide income taxes on $1.9 million profit.".
Additionally, Compaq asserted that the ADR transaction had
economic substance because a reasonable opportunity for pretax
profit existed.1" In response, the court stated that cases using
pretax profit refer "to profit independent of tax savings, i.e.,
economic profit."1" The court concluded that Compaq "used tax
reporting strategies to give the illusion of profit, while
simultaneously claiming a tax credit in an amount (nearly $3.4
million) that far exceeds the U.S. tax (of $640,000) attributed to the
alleged profit, and thus is available to offset tax on unrelated
transactions." ' 9 It determined that Compaq, by reporting the gross
142. See id. at *16.
143. See id
144. See id
145. See id. Compaq calculated its net profit on the ADR transaction as
follows:
ADR purchase trades
($887,577,129)
ADR sale trades
868.412.129
Net cash from transaction
($19,165,000)
Royal Dutch Dividend
22,545,800
Transaction costs
(1.485.685)
PRETAX PROFIT
$1,895,115

See id.
146. See id. at *18 (taking into account Compaq's estimated $640,000 U.S.
income tax and $3.4 million tax credit).
147. See id. at *18.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *18-19. Compaq was decided before the enactment of I.R.C.
§ 904(d), which places limitations on using foreign tax credits used to offset
unrelated income. See I.R.C. § 904(d) as amended by Pub L. No. 106-170, Title
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amount of the dividend when only the net amount was received,
fabricated a $1.9 million profit as a predicate for a $3.4 million tax
credit.'

Viewing the transaction this way, the economic substance

of the transaction was insignificant compared to the tax benefits
obtained. 1
The Tax Court considered the withholding tax in testing the
economic substance of the transaction, and demonstrated that
Compaq would incur an economic loss from the transaction but for
the foreign tax credit.' The capital loss from the ADR transaction
provided a tax benefit when capital gains existed, and consequently
the foreign tax credit had leverage on which to work.' The Court
concluded that the cash flow deficit arising from the transaction
was predetermined and tightly controlled to "capture" a foreign
tax credit.' Thus, in this sense, Compaq "was acquiring a foreign
tax credit, not substantive ownership of Royal Dutch ADR[s]."'
2. Market Risks

To test whether Compaq's ADR transaction had business
substance, the court considered the extent to which Compaq
exposed itself to market risks." After considering the specific facts
and circumstances embodied in this ADR transaction, the Court
concluded that the transactions were not economically substantial,
partly based on its finding that the transaction was devoid of
market risks, and thus a tax artifice.'
Compaq argued that
economic risks were associated with the ADR transaction.' The
Court found, however, that the ADR transaction, as designed,
V, § 501, Dec. 17,1999,113 Stat. 1860.
150. See id at *19.
151. See id. (comparing the $3A million tax credit to Compaq's alleged $1.9
million profit). Notably, Compaq indirectly paid the withholding tax when it
received the dividend net of the withheld tax.

152. See id. at *19-20.
153. See id. at *21 (stating that the loss was prearranged to take advantage of a
foreign tax credit).
154. See id. at *20-21.
155. Id. at *21.
156. See id. at *21-22.
157. See id.
158. See i. at *21.
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could only result in a capital loss for Compaq."9
In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized the
circumstances surrounding the ADR transaction." It pointed out
that none of Compaq's representatives conducted an analysis or
investigation of the economic risks Compaq claimed surrounded
the transaction."" The facts showed that the purchase and resale
prices were predetermined by Twenty-First (the investment firm),
and that the floor brokers did not have the authority to deviate
from the predetermined prices even if price changes occurred, and
"there was virtually no risk of price fluctuation."''
The parties
used special next-day settlement terms and traded large blocks of
ADRs to minimize the risk that third parties would break up the
cross-trades." Moreover, because the cross-trades were at market
price, the risk that other traders might break up the trades was
eliminated."' Consequently, "[n]one of the outgoing cash-flow
resulted from risks." '65 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
transaction was predetermined and deliberately designed by
Compaq and Twenty-First to yield a specific result." This analysis
is consistent with the other decisions applying the economic
substance in focusing on transactions that limit the economic
consequences to the taxpayer while preserving the taxpayer's
purported tax benefits. 67
3. I.R.C. .§901(k) as a Counterto the Economic Substance Doctrine
Compaq argued that the economic substance doctrine was
inapplicable to the ADR transaction because the foreign tax credit
159. See id. at *21-22 (stating that tax-motivated trading patterns generally
indicate a lack of economic substance).
160. See id. at *22.
161. See id. at *21.
162. Id. at *22.
163.
164.
165.

See id.
See id.
Id.

166. See id.
167. See supra notes 31-53 (discussing the economic substance doctrine as
applied in Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (1966), Sheldon v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738 (1990), and ACM Partnershipv. Commissioner, 157
F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999)).

2000]

CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS

227

regime set forth Congress' intent regarding allowable foreign tax
credits."
Compaq maintained that Congress intended by its
enactment of I.R.C. § 901(k)'69 to prevent only those foreign tax
credits that failed to meet its requirements, and preclude
application of an "additional economic substance requirement."'"
Compaq asserted that the effect of Congress' action was to bar the
use of the economic substance doctrine in factual circumstances
such as those at issue in the case."'
The court examined the background of the foreign tax credit,
noting that its purpose was to prevent double taxation and to
facilitate international transactions.t ' Relying on its finding that
no bona fide business purpose arose in this case, the court
reasoned that Congress did not intend to encourage or permit a
transaction that was "merely a manipulation
of the foreign tax
'
savings."'
tax
U.S.
achieve
to
credit
Moreover, the Court held that I.R.C. § 901(k) had no effect on
its conclusion because it was enacted five years after the
transaction at issue.' 4 To support this finding, the court relied on a
Senate Finance Committee report indicating that "'[n]o inference
[was] intended as to the treatment under present law of taxmotivated transactions intended to transfer foreign tax credit
benefits."" '5
C. Business PurposeDoctrine
Compaq stated that it entered into the ADR transaction for
the business purpose of making a profit on a short-term investment
in addition to the tax savings. 6 According to the Tax Court, the

168 See Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *24.
169. I.R.C. § 901(k). This statute was enacted as part of the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997. Pub. L. No. 105-34, Title X, § 1053(a), 111 Stat. 941.
170. See Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *25.
171. See id
172.

See id. at *24-26.

173. Id
174. See id. at *26.
175. Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *25 (quoting S. Rep. No. 10533, at 177 (1997)).
176.

See id at *23.
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business purpose requirement of the economic substance inquiry
requires that the transaction be rationally related to a plausible
nontax economic benefit.1 " This inquiry required the court to
consider whether Compaq conducted itself in a "realistic and
legitimate business fashion," analyzing the ADR transaction's
viability at the moment Compaq decided to proceed with it.17
The Court found that the undisputed facts undermined
Compaq's business purpose argument.'
The Court pointed out
that Twenty-First marketed the ADR to Compaq as a device to
partially shield the capital gain it realized on its sale of Conner
Peripherals stock."w In addition, the Court found that Compaq's
evaluation of the ADR transaction was "less than businesslike,"
involving minimal investigation and analysis into the proposed
investment relative to its scale.'
On the basis of Compaq's
conduct in contemplating the transaction, the Tax Court concluded
that Compaq "had no business purpose for the purchase and sale
of Royal Dutch ADRs apart from obtaining a Federal income tax
benefit in the form of a foreign tax credit while offsetting the
previously recognized capital gain.""
D. Applicationof the Accuracy-Related Penalty
After concluding that the ADR transaction was tax-motivated,
the Court examined whether the accuracy-related penalty pursuant
to I.R.C. § 6662(a) was properly applied."' The IRS had imposed
the penalty because Compaq "negligently disregarded the
economic substance of the ADR transaction....""' Compaq had

177.

See id. at *22 (citing A CM Partnership1).

178.
179.

See id. at *23.
See id. at *23-24.

180. See id. at *23.
181. Id. (noting that the agent who entered into the ADR transaction on
Compaq's behalf, although "a well-educated, experienced, and financially
sophisticated businessman," chose to commit Compaq to a multimillion-dollar
transaction based solely on "one meeting with Twenty-First and his call to a

Twenty-First reference."). Id.
182. Id. at *13.
183. See id. at *26-29.
184. Id. at *27.
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the burden of proving that the IRS's determination was
erroneous.1" To meet this burden, Compaq was required to show
that it acted "with reasonable cause and in good faith" under the
relevant facts and circumstances." Thus, the key question was
Compaq's reasonableness in deciding it was entitled to the foreign
tax credits at issue."' Compaq argued that its return position was
reasonable since the economic substance doctrine as applied to the
ADR transaction is "inherently imprecise," and use of the
economic substance doctrine to disallow a foreign tax credit raised
an issue of first impression."
The Court concluded that Compaq was liable for the accuracyrelated penalty because Compaq, employing sophisticated
professionals with investment experience, should have been alerted
to the questionable economic nature of the ADR transaction."t
These professionals failed to investigate the basic details of the
transaction, such as "the corporation Compaq was investing in, the
parties Compaq was doing business with, or even the cash-flow
implications of the transaction."'" Additionally, Compaq did not
offer evidence that it satisfied the "reasonable and ordinarily
prudent person" standard, or that it even relied on the advice of its
tax department or counsel."9 No communications were submitted
into evidence to show that Compaq considered the validity of the
tax return position when the return was prepared and filed."t
Accordingly, the Court determined that Compaq failed to carry its
burden of showing the existence of reasonable cause or good faith
in taking the position that it was entitled to a foreign tax credit."t
185. See id. at *26-27 (citations omitted).
186. See id. at *27 (citing I.RIC. § 6664(c)(1) (1994)).
187. See Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *27. The most important
factor in this inquiry is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the proper tax
liability for the year. See id; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in
1998).
18& See Id. at *28.
189. See id. (stating that the sophisticated executives, evaluating the
transaction, "failed to take even the most rudimentary steps to investigate the
bonafide economic aspects of the ADR transaction.").
190. See Id.
191. See Id.
192. See id. at *28-29.
193. See id. at *29 (finding that Compaq was negligent).
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Ill. IMPLICATIONS OF COMPAQ ON THE TREASURY PROPOSAL

Compaq was decided approximately two months after the July
1, 1999 release of the Treasury report addressing the problem of
corporate tax shelters, in which it proposed that Congress change
the "substantive law to disallow the use of tax benefits generated
by a corporate tax shelter."''"
The Treasury proposed that
Congress codify the economic substance doctrine to provide
corporations with clearer guidance on how to analyze market
transactions.195 Compaq provides a useful and timely insight into
how the economic substance and business purpose doctrines would
be applied if codified by Congress. For example, the court in
Compaq focused on the ADR transaction's lack of pretax profit,
which was also emphasized by the Treasury in its proposed
definition of "tax avoidance transaction."'96 The Report also stated
that the definition of "corporate tax shelter" must test the
taxpayer's expected tax benefits and the expected economic
consequences from the transaction." The Treasury suggested that
codifying these common law doctrines would give taxpayers useful
principles to evaluate the propriety of corporate tax shelter
transactions.'9 8
As discussed below, the main challenge has been to find a way
to forewarn corporations of the specific characteristics of
questionable
transactions,
without
inhibiting
legitimate
transactions. Weaknesses in Compaq's opinion, stemming from
the Tax Court's use of the economic substance and business
purpose doctrines, shed light on the soundness of the Treasury's

194.
195.

See Problemof CorporateTax Shelters,supranote 2, at para. 22.
See id.
196. See supra Part II.B.1. (discussing the Compaq Court's analysis of the
ADR transaction's pre-tax profit); Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note
2, at para. 264 (defining a tax avoidance transaction as one in which "the
reasonably expected pre-tax profit... is insignificant relative to the reasonably

expected net tax benefits.").
197. See id. at para. 282.
198. See id at para. 279-80 (noting that taxpayers have tended to disregard
the doctrines by distinguishing the facts of their own transactions from those facts
governing current case law). The Report queries, "[W]hat good is a significant
understatement penalty if there is not understatement?") Id.
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strategy to use a codified definition of "tax avoidance" to
effectively combat tax shelters. Attacks against corporate tax
shelters have primarily been hindered by (1) an inability to define
what factors constitute a lack of economic substance, and (2) an
inability to apply these factors to fact-specific transactions. Critics
against codifying these common law doctrines, focusing mainly on
the vagueness of most proposed definitions, illustrate how difficult
it is to define what constitutes a "tax avoidance" transaction."
Compaq helps evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the
Treasury's proposed statutory amendment.
A. Calculatinga Transaction'sEconomic Substance
1. Adopting the ACM Partnership Analysis
Compaq illustrates the principle that a transaction motivated
solely by tax avoidance and lacking a nontax business purpose wil
not stand in court.'
In Compaq, the Tax Court employed an
economic and legal analysis akin to the one undertaken in the
ACM Partnership case."' In each case, the Court denied the
corporation the purported tax benefits of the transaction. This
occurred even though the facts suggest that Compaq undertook a
more apparent tax shelter than ACM Partnership did.'
Compaq's fate was sealed once the Court adopted the Third
Circuit's analysis of the economic substance and business pupose
doctrines outlined in ACM Partnership.3 In line with this analysis,
199.

See id at para. 275 (noting that the Administration's proposal to grant

the Secretary the authority to disallow certain tax benefits derived from tax
avoidance transactions has been widely criticized).
200. See supra Parts II.A.-B. (reviewing the Compaq court's application of the
economic substance doctrine).
201. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (describing the
development of the economic substance doctrine in the ACM case).

202. See supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text (describing the Compaq
ADR transaction as motivated solely by the expectation of tax benefit and
devoid of any other business purpose).
203. See Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *22 (citing ACM
Partnership I in adopting the economic substance and business purpose
doctrines).
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the Compaq court compared the tax benefit from the transaction
to the alleged amount of economic profit that would be derived
from the ADR transaction, finding that Compaq had no
opportunity to earn a nontax economic profit on the purchase and
sale of the ADR transaction.'
Compaq's claimed $3.4 million
foreign tax credit, however, far exceeded Compaq's declared U.S.
income tax of $640,000 assessable on the transaction.' Thus, the
court concluded that Compaq fabricated a $1.9 million profit as a
predicate for a $3.4 million tax credit.' Interestingly, the Court
did not give any weight to the fact that the $3.4 million tax had
actually been indirectly paid by Compaq, that is, paid by Royal
Dutch on behalf of Compaq.' Rather, it focused on the strategy
used by Compaq to acquire a foreign tax credit-tax savings
beneficial to Compaq in the United States.'
2. Lack of Economic Risks
The Court also focused on the lack of any market risks
surrounding the transaction that would give the ADR transaction
economic substance.'
Seeking to offset its large capital gain,
Compaq specifically engaged in an ADR transaction lacking
market risks and structured it to guarantee a capital loss generating
the benefit of a foreign tax credit."' Consequently, the transaction
was a tax artifice because it did not involve any market risks."
Unfortunately, the Court did not define how much economic
risk is needed before a transaction is respected for tax purposes.
For instance, would the Court have reached a different conclusion
if the prices of the cross-trades were priced off market rather than
204. See id. at *18-19.
205. See id. at *19.
206. See supra notes 148-51.
207. See Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *19. The Court makes no
reference to the effect of the $3.4 million withholding tax. See id.
208. See supra notes 153-55 (discussing the court's finding that the ADR
transaction was predetermined to yield a specific result for tax savings).
209. See supra Part II.C.2. (discussing the Compaq court's analysis of market
risks in the ADR transaction).
210. See id,
211. See id.
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at market price?' If Compaq held the Royal Dutch ADRs for a
longer period of time while still gaining a foreign tax credit, would
the Court then have viewed Compaq as acquiring substantive
ownership?'
The Court's analysis of the ADR transaction was
very fact-oriented. No bright line was given to mark the degree of
economic risk needed for an ADR transaction to withstand
scrutiny under the economic substance doctrine."
B. Uncovering a TransactionsBusiness Purpose

1. Lack of Investigation
After completing the economic substance inquiry, the court
examined whether the ADR transaction was rationally related to,
and plausible in light of, Compaq's stated short-term investment
business plan' Again, the court focused on the objective facts of
the ADR transaction to conclude that Compaq's conduct in
choosing the transaction was inconsistent with a legitimate
investment strategy? 6 The court inferred by Compaq's lack of
investigation under the circumstances that the transaction was
motivated solely by the tax benefits and no other business purpose
existed 7
The court's business purpose analysis focused on whether
Compaq thoroughly considered the ramifications of the ADR
212. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (noting the pricing of the
cross-trades at issue in Compaq and its significance to the case).

213. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (reviewing the fact that
Compaq bought and resold the Royal Dutch ADRs within the space of an hour).
See also supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (quoting the Compaq court's
opinion that Compaq sought to acquire a foreign tax credit rather than
substantive ownership of the stock).
214. Id. at *23 (stating that the objective facts belie Compaq's assertion of a
business purpose). The court concluded that Compaq was motivated by the
expected tax benefits of the ADR transaction, without explicitly stating what
facts would have allowed the transaction to withstand judicial scrutiny. Id. at *24.
215. See supra Part II.C. (discussing the Compaq court's application of the
business purpose doctine).
216. Id.
217.

Id.
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transaction.218 Unfortunately, the Court did not define how much
investigation is needed before a corporation can safely engage in a
transaction."9 For example, in "day trading," investments in stocks
are usually not preceded by an investigation of the underlying
corporation. How much investigation is required for a taxpayer to
claim tax benefits from market trading? Or was the fact that
Compaq used the stock exchange to engage in a "predetermined
strategy" the basis for the court's conclusion?'
2. Marketing Transactions
The Compaq court strongly emphasized the fact that TwentyFirst (the investment firm) marketed the ADR transaction to
Compaq "for the purpose of partially shielding a capital gain"
previously realized by Compaq." The letter soliciting Compaq's
business stated that Twenty-First had "'uncovered a number of
strategies that take advantage of a capital gain."
In addition, the
ADR transaction was predetermined and controlled by TwentyFirst to generate the tax benefits for Compaq, while the transaction
fee was nearly $1 million.'
Again, Compaq's alleged pretax
economic profit was only $1.9 million.' In the Court's opinion,
this supported the conclusion that no true investment motive for
engaging in the ADR transaction existed.'
The frequent appearance of letters similar to the one TwentyFirst sent to Compaq evidence a thriving industry of marketing
corporate tax shelters.' Corporations are motivated solely by the
218. See id. at *23.
219. See id. The Court found Compaq's evaluation of the ADR transaction
"less than businesslike," yet it provided no examples to clarify what are

legitimate, "businesslike" transactions. See id.
220. See id. *20-21 (stating that the ADR transaction was "predetermined"
and tightly controlled to "capture" a foreign tax credit).
221.
222.

Id. at *23.
Id at *5.

223.

See id. at *13.

224. See id. at *11, 16.
225. See idU at *23-24. (concluding that the record indicated that Compaq was
motivated by the tax benefits).

226.

See Novack & Saunders, supra note 1 at 198 (discussing similar letters

sent by an accounting firm to corporations).
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tax benefits these transactions promise to generate.' While most
corporations rely on advisers to help minimize their taxes, schemes
shaped solely by tax avoidance form a different genre, a
development which has not gone unnoticed by the courts.' These
schemes are often pitched as "products" to corporations facing
pressure to lower their effective tax rates, and have little if any
economic justification apart from tax savings!m In Compaq,
Twenty-First's role in implementing the ADR transaction strategy
was a strong indicator to the court that the transaction was solely
motivated by tax considerations.'
Corporations should be wary of transactions marketed as tax
saving ideas because the IRS is likely to take that fact into account

in determining their viability. Furthermore, a penalty for engaging
in these transactions may be assessed on the grounds that they are

not reasonably valid under the law.

Before engaging in market

transactions, a corporation should at least consult with legal
counsel.' However, legal advice does not guarantee protection;
corporations can still be denied tax benefits even when they have
obtained legal advice."
227. See id.(quoting a tax executive stating that companies "are taking
provisions in the code intended to serve a normal, useful purpose and exploiting
them in a manner that has no economic justification except tax savings.").
228. See id at *14 (stressing the difference between "(1) closing out a real
economic loss in order to minimize taxes or arranging a contemplated business
transaction in a tax-advantaged manner and (2) entering into a prearranged loss
transaction designed solely for the reduction of taxes on unrelated income." ).
229. See, e.g., Novack & Saunders, supra note 1, at 203 (discussing the
marketing of products that utilize "special and unique strategies.... [that] can
save a client.., hundreds of millions in tax"). These transactions superficially
follow all tax code provisions but are not meant to have any economic
justification besides tax savings. ld. at 206.
230. See Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct.LEXIS 44, at *24 (noting that TwentyFirst marketed the ADR transaction as a tax shelter in holding that Compaq was
motivated by tax benefits rather than an investment purpose).
231. See id.
at *29 (concluding that Compaq was negligent in claiming the
foreign tax credit and upholding the accuracy-related penalty under I.RLC. §
6662).
232. See id.
at *28 (considering lack of reliance on counsel in its determination
of Compaq's "negligen[t] disregard [of] the economic substance of the ADR
transaction....").
233. See, e.g., ACM PartnershipI, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189-90, 2199 (holding
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C. Avoiding the Accuracy-Related Penalt
A taxpayer engaging in a transaction lacking economic
substance and a business purpose may have to pay an accuracyrelated penalty under I.R.C. § 6662" The Compaq court upheld
the penalty in part because Compaq's sophisticated executives
failed to take "even the most rudimentary steps to investigate the
bona fide economic aspects of the ADR transaction. ' ' " In
addition, Compaq did not offer evidence that it satisfied the
"reasonable and ordinarily prudent person" standard required
under § 6662, or that it relied on the advice of its tax department or
other counsel. 6 Compaq also failed to investigate the details of
the ADR transaction or its cash flow implications, procedures
regularly employed by Compaq's treasury department.'
How much of an investigation would prevent the imposition of
the penalty? Would Compaq have escaped the penalty if a cash
flow had been prepared with the same consequence?"s Or was its
tax position inherently unreasonable, thus warranting imposition
of the penalty? 9 The Court's opinion seems to suggest that
Compaq could have avoided the 20% penalty if it had sought legal
Perhaps the Court
advice regarding the ADR transaction. '
believed that, if notified, Compaq's tax department or tax counsel
that the ADR transaction lacked economic substance even though the parties
consulted with legal counsel).
234. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (describing the accuracyrelated penalty).
235. Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *28; see supra Part II.D.
(discussing the court's application of the accuracy-related penalty).
236. See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text (reviewing the court's
findings on the issue of negligence).
237. Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *7 (stating the finding of fact
that "cash-flow was generally important to petitioner's investment
decisions .... ).
238. See id. at *28 (noting Compaq's failure to take "the most rudimentary
steps to investigate the bona fide economic aspects of the ADR transaction" as
evidence of its negligence).
239. See id. at *28 (holding that there was no reasonable cause for Compaq's
return position for the ADR transaction).
240. See id. ("Petitioner offered no evidence that it satisfied the 'reasonable
and ordinarily prudent person' standard or relied on the advice of its tax
department or counsel.").
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would have policed the use of corporate tax shelters by rendering
an unfavorable opinion of the ADR transaction.
Before obtaining legal advice, a corporation may be deterred
from engaging in a seemingly legitimate transaction, fearing the
consequences if the IRS invalidates the transaction. When the IRS
discovers tax shelters that follow the letter of the law, however,
they are unlikely to impose penalties!"' For this reason, shelter
promoters try to obtain legal opinions validating the legitimacy of
their products!'
Presumably, this protects corporations from
penalties should a transaction fall apart. It has been suggested that
shelter promoters can easily obtain favorable opinions from
outside tax counsel, albeit for sizable fee.
D. Conflicting Statutory Law
The economic substance and business purpose doctrines may
conflict with statutory laws that address abusive transactions. A
corporation may engage in a transaction that seems legitimate and
follows all statutory requirements, yet have its transaction
invalidated due to an inequity perceived by a reviewing authority.
Because there are no specific guidelines or tests explaining these
common law doctrines, corporations are uncertain whether these
doctrines will be applied to particular transactions.
1. I.R.C. § 901(k)
There is concern that the IRS will invalidate transactions that
meet the literal requirements of the tax code. A question arose in

241.

See Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 2, at para. 240

("[Mlany commentators note that the substantial underpayment penalty is not an
effective method to address current corporate tax shelter activity because the
reasonable cause exception... has become an almost fool-proof escape hatch
from the penalty regime.").
242. See Novack & Saunders, supra note 1, at 199 (reporting that some

prestigious law firms "are raking in huge fees writing opinions to justify [tax
shelters].").
243. See id at 202 ("Because the [economic substance] doctrine is so fuzzy and

most deals arguably follow the letter of the law, shelter promoters can easily
obtain legal opinions asserting that these products are likely to work.").

238

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE
AND FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. V

Compaq regarding whether the Court could invalidate a
transaction that met the requirements of I.R.C. § 901(k), which sets
forth the minimum time period during which a taxpayer must be
exposed to the risk of market fluctuations before becoming
entitled to a foreign tax credit.' Compaq essentially argued that a
taxpayer should be able to obtain the benefit of a foreign tax credit
if he or she meets the statutory requirements. 43 Yet, many tax
shelters follow the tax code's technical requirements, structuring
transactions to generate benefits while lacking market risk.'
Corporate taxpayers may seek to structure transactions to
meet the literal requirements of I.R.C. § 901(k) to limit their
market exposure.
For example, a corporation may enter
transactions hedging against currency and general market risk
through options, "which generally move in a similar pattern to the
target security if the currency and market risks are factored out,"
and can be used to hedge most of the remaining risk.' However,
hedges add transaction costs that will likely invoke scrutiny under
the economic substance doctrine, even if they are not labeled as an
interest in substantially similar or related property.' 8
The IRS generally combats these schemes by invoking the
economic substance and business purpose doctrines as defined in
Gregory v. Helvering' 9 and its progeny.'
A court would most
likely void a hedging transaction as described above that meets the
literal requirements of I.R.C. § 901(k) but has no economic
justification except for tax savings. The court in Compaq found
that § 901 (k) was not intended to preclude application of then244.

See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (outlining the provisions of

1.RLC. § 901(k)).
245. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
246. See Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 2, at para. 276
("Many, if not most, current corporate tax shelters 'might work' under the
applicable objective mechanical rules of the Code, but 'shouldn't work' under"
principles of common law or tax policy).; Novack & Saunders, supra note 1, at
202 ("[M]ost deals arguably follow the letter of the law .... ).
247. See Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Economic Substance Needed
for Foreign Tax Credit, reprinted in 1999 Tax Notes Today 194-28 (Oct. 7, 1999)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX library, TNT file), at para. 21.
248. See id.
249. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
250. See supraPart I.A.-B.
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existing legal doctrines to transactions involving foreign tax

credits. '

Consequently, transactions passing the requirements of

I.R.C. § 901(k) must also survive judicial scrutiny under the
economic substance doctrine. Even when a corporation complies
with statutes targeting specific tax abuses, it needs further
assurance that the transaction has economic substance.
2. I.R.S. Notice 98-5
The Tax Court's opinion in Compaq is consistent with the
position the IRS took in Notice 98-5,' which targets foreign tax
credit transactions in which the expected economic profit is slight
small compared to the value of the credit'S The court described
Compaq's "fictional" economic profit of $1.9 million on the ADR
transaction as a "predicate for a $3.4 million tax credit," echoing
the comparison approach of Notice 98-15.
Furthermore, the
court's statement that the foreign tax credit regime is meant to
"prevent double taxation and facilitate [bona fide] international
business transactions"' 55enunciates the central theme of Notice 985: that it is meant to relieve unfair tax consequences of investing
abroad rather than provide a tax incentive for such activity.
Finally, it follows Notice 98-5's general approach in not precluding
the application of other law, such as common law doctrines, to
corporate tax shelters exploiting foreign tax credits?7
251. See supra notes 174-75 (discussing the court's reliance on a Senate report
stating that "no inference [was] intended" in respect to the application of other
law to foreign tax credit transactions).
252. I.LS. Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334, reprinted in IRS Targets Abusive
Foreign Tax CreditSchemes, 97 Tax Notes Today 247-3 (Dec. 24, 1997) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX Library, TNT File).
253. See supraPart I.D.
254. Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *19.
255. Id. at *24.
256. See I.LKS. Notice 98-5, supra note 252, at para. 4, 7 ("[T]he foreign tax
credit was enacted to preserve neutrality between U.S. and foreign investment by
providing relief from double taxation.... No statutory purpose is served by
permitting credits for taxes generated in abusive transactions designed to reduce
residual U.S. tax on low-taxed foreign-source income.").
257. See id. at para. 30 (declaring that the regulations to be issued "will not
limit the application of other principles of existing law to determine the proper
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The difficulty with this approach is that it eschews any sort of
clear test to help corporations decide whether they should proceed
with foreign investments that will consequently generate foreign
tax credits. Applying the economic substance doctrine to
transactions which yield foreign tax credits ignores the technical
approach already present in the Code. Specifically, it ignores the
fact that under the existing I.R.C. § 904(d) basket limitations, U.S.
corporations have already been forced to accumulate unused
foreign tax credits.'
While Compaq suggests that obtaining advice for tax counsel
may prevent imposition of the accuracy-related penalty in a
transaction that comes under attack, 9 it does not assure that the
tax benefits will not be denied by the IRS.' The potential reversal
of tax credits may deter some U.S. corporations from engaging in
legitimate foreign investments. To achieve the foreign tax credit's
intended purpose, a proposed solution to corporate tax avoidance
must ameliorate this problem and address the current situation of
companies paying foreign taxes that are of no benefit to them.26 '
3. Tax Treaties
The Compaq opinion did not discuss the tax credit provisions
of the U.S.-Netherlands income tax treaty' in effect for 1992.2"
tax consequences of the structures or transactions addressed in the regulations.")
258. See Raby & Raby, supra note 247, at para. 24 (commenting that those
who favor the approach of Notice 98-5 "conveniently ignore the highly technical
approach to [foreign tax credits] that has created the situation where U.S.
corporations have huge amounts of unused [credits].").
259. Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *28 (finding that Compaq's
conduct was negligent in part because there was no evidence that it relied on the
advice of its tax counsel).
260. See ACM Partnership I, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189-90, 2199 (denying tax
benefits of the subject transaction even though the taxpayer consulted with legal
counsel).
261. See Raby & Raby, supra note 247, at para. 24.
262. Convention Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
the Netherlands with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, Apr.
29, 1948, U.S.-Neth., 62 Stat. 1757, amended by United States-Netherlands
Supplementary Income Tax Convention, Dec. 30, 1965, U.S.-Neth., T.I.A.S. No.
6051, repealedby Convention Between the United States and the Kingdom of the
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Article XIX, paragraph (2) of that treaty provides:
The United States shall allow to a citizen, resident or
corporation of the United States as a credit against its [U.S.
Federal income tax] the appropriate amount of taxes paid to
the Netherlands. Such appropriate amount shall be based upon
the amount of tax paid to the Netherlands on income from
sources within the Netherlands but shall not exceed that
portion of the United States tax which taxable income from
sources within the Netherlands bears to the entire taxable
income.7'
Compaq could have plausibly argued that these provisions allowed
it to take a credit for the withholding tax, regardless of whether the
foreign tax credit was available under U.S. law.
That argument, however, is vulnerable to attack under the
"congressional intent" rationale the Compaq court used to justify
applying the economic substance doctrine despite I.R.C. § 901(k).
The U.S.-Netherlands Treaty was originally designed to facilitate
international trade and investment by lessening tax barriers that
inhibit the international flow of goods and services." Given the

Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., S. Treaty
Doc. No. 103-6 (1992), amended by Protocol Amending the Convention Between
the United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, Oct. 13, 1993, U.S.-Neth., S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-19 (1993) [hereinafter
U.S.-Netherlands Treaty].
263. See Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax CL LEXIS 44, at *12 (mentioning only the
withholding tax provision in the treaty).
264. U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 262, art. XIX, para. 2, 62 Stat. at
1761.
265. See Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *24. The Court looked at
the history and purpose of the foreign tax credit. It concluded that the foreign
tax credit does not apply to a taxpayer manipulating the Code solely to avoid
paying U.S. taxes. Id
266. See William J. Clinton, Tax Convention with the Netherlands: Letter of
Transmittal,May 12, 1993, 1993 WL 761650, *1 (transmitting for the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification the Convention Between the United States
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed on
Dec. 18,1992).
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specific facts in Compaq, the court probably would have found that
denying a credit for the withholding tax would not hamper
international trade since its ADR purchase and resale trades all
occurred within one hour, for no business purpose beyond gaining
a tax benefit on U.S. taxable income.' The Compaq court might
take the position that the income tax treaty, like § 901(k), was not
designed to insulate "sham" transactions, and disallow the foreign
tax credit accordingly, despite the fact that the Netherlands tax was
actually paid.'
Compaq could have raised a policy argument based on the
U.S.-Netherlands Treaty to justify its foreign tax credit. The
Executive Branch of the United States, in its power to conduct
foreign relations, has the exclusive authority to negotiate treaties.269
These treaties have the same force as federal law,"O and in the case
of a conflict with statutory law, the one adopted later in time
prevails."
Individual states are not relieved of U.S. treaty
obligations, and failure to comply with a treaty results in a
violation of international law.'m
Even if done unwittingly,
breaching or acting against a treaty may terminate or partially
terminate the treaty.m
The Compaq court's decision is therefore controversial
because it denied a benefit provided for in an income tax treaty.
The court surely weighed the implications of denying a credit
based on taxes actually indirectly paid to the Netherlands
government.
Aside from the general constitutional and
international law implications, I.R.C. § 7852(d) states that neither a

267. See Compaq, 1999 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *24 (concluding that there
was no bona fide business puspose implicated by the ADR transaction).
268. Cf. id. (declining to limit application of the economic substance doctrine
on the basis that it was not Congress' intent in enacting I.R.C. § 901(k) to allow
non-bona fide transactions that manipulate the foreign tax credit regime).
269. See U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the U.S. § 302 cmt. d. (1986) [hereinafter Restatement].
270. See Restatement, supranote 269, § 115 cmt. a.
271. See id. § 115.
272. See id § 207; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
art. XXVII.
273. See Restatement, supranote 269, § 321 cmt. b.
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treaty provision nor a tax provision has preferential status.f'
Moreover, I.R.C. § 894(a) provides that Code provisions should be
applied "with due regard to any treaty obligation of the United
States. " S On the other hand, the U.S. policy position is that tax
treaties should not restrict the scope of worldwide income taxation
in the state of residence any more than is necessary to avoid
international double taxation. 6 It is unclear whether the IRS's
accuracy-related penalty would have been upheld if Compaq had
claimed that it relied on the income tax treaty before taking a
foreign tax credit.'m Given the facts in Compaq, the Court
probably would have denied the foreign tax credit regardless of
whether Compaq claimed reliance on the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty,
since the credit was intentionally generated to serve as a shelter for
U.S. taxes.'
CONCLUSION
The Tax Court's analysis in Compaq embodied many of the
policies the Treasury Department put forth in its proposal. The
major parallel was its analysis of the lack of economic substance of
the ADR transaction engaged in by Compaq, but within that the
court's focus on the presence of promotion or marketing efforts, as
well as high transaction costs, is particularly noteworthy. One can
expect these principles to become reinforced by codification of the
economic substance doctrine.
If Compaq is an indication of things to come, it is a useful
demonstration of weaknesses in the Treasury's proposed new

274.

I.RC. § 7852(d) (1994).

275. I.R.C. § 894(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
276. See, e.g., Warren Christopher, Tax Convention with the Netherlands:
Letter of Submittal, April 23, 1993, 1993 WL 761650, *1-3 (submitting to the
Senate the Convention Between the United States and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed on Dec. 18,1992).
277. See supra notes 191-92 (reviewing the Compaq court's finding that no
evidence was offered to carry Compaq's burden of proof that its return position
was reasonable and in good faith).

278. 1999 U.S Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *24 (stating that Compaq manipulated the
foreign tax credit to achieve U.S. tax savings).
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approach. The major problem with the economic substance
doctrine is that its application is intensely fact-driven, and does not
establish clear guidelines for appropriate behavior. In particular,
the economic substance doctrine by itself indicate what kinds of
profit and loss are relevant to the analysis. For example, in
Compaq, the Netherlands tax of $3.4 million withheld on
Compaq's ADR dividend was reasonably viewed as a predicate to
a U.S. foreign tax credit, although it was also an actual transaction
cost. It remains unclear, however, what kind of transaction costs
should be characterized as investment losses rather than
justifications for tax benefits. Similarly, the complete lack of
market risks in the ADR transaction was obvious from its facts,
but Compaq leaves unanswered what degree of risk the economic
substance doctrine demands. On the other hand, Compaq did
ensure that facts indicating the presence of promotion and
marketing efforts of a suspect transaction will remain highly
relevant to whether it satisfies the business purpose requirement of
the economic substance doctrine.
The second major difficulty with the economic substance
doctrine is that it may complicate more targeted corporate tax
shelter legislation. Where this is the case, it is a legitimate question
whether Congress intended common law doctrine to apply. The
Compaq court was able to apply specific congressional guidance in
dealing with I.R.C. § 901(k), but it also proclaimed as a broad
principle that Congress had not intended to permit transactions
that manipulate the foreign tax credit to achieve tax savings. This
suggests that the Tax Court has broad discretion in using the
economic substance doctrine to scrutinize transactions where a
statute also applies. The court should have considered whether
this discretion could have allowed the doctrine to prevail over tax
treaties, such as the U.S.-Netherlands income tax treaty, which
seems to protect the foreign tax credit Compaq claimed.
Applying the economic substance doctrine in circumstances
where statutory law applies may help reach just results, but it may
also chill legitimate transactions. Targeted legislative attacks on
tax shelter transactions, such as I.R.C. § 901(k), are meant to
create "bright lines" that corporations can use to avoid liability.
As Compaq demonstrates, the letter of the law can be twisted to
create a tax shelter that was not contemplated by the applicable
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statutes. The Tax Court's approach, however, which parallels the
IRS's Notice 98-5, appears to go beyond how Congress intended to
treat foreign tax credits. U.S. corporations may be discouraged by
this decision from engaging in international transactions if they are
denied the use of foreign tax credits. Given the increase in
economic globalization, clear guidance should be provided to allow
U.S. corporations to invest abroad and to effectively compete in an
emerging global market.
Corporations therefore face the possibility that transactions
not specifically prohibited in advance by the Code vill nevertheless
be voided upon further review. They are also confronted with the
prospect of being sanctioned with an accuracy-related penalty.
While Compaq suggests that reliance on legal advice may prevent
the IRS from imposing an accuracy-related penalty, it does not
ensure that the IRS will not initiate a proceeding to the tax
benefits. Even if they receive favorable opinions, some U.S.
corporations may be deterred from engaging in genuine foreign
investments. Furthermore, by placing the applicable statutory
guidelines in doubt, more widespread use of the economic
substance doctrine may make it more difficult to obtain favorable
legal opinions.
Overall, however, transactions like the one in Compaq present
a compelling case that the substantive tax law must be changed to
address corporate tax shelters. Until the Code is changed,
corporations will continue to exploit discontinuities in the tax law
to achieve tax savings to reach their primary goal-maximizing
shareholder value.'
To date, most attacks on corporate tax
shelters have been targeted at specific transactions on an ad hoc
basis. As the Treasury Proposal notes, this type of case-by-case
review simply encourages taxpayers to move from specifically
prohibited transactions to others whose treatment has not yet been
contested."1 Moreover, the government spends an enormous
amount of its resources attempting to address these activities: the

279. See Problem of CorporateTax Shelters, supranote 2, at para. 45.
280. See id. at para. 1 (describing the current state of the law as using an
"after-the-fact, ad hoc approach.").
281. See idL at para. 40.
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ACM Partnership' case alone cost the Federal government over
$2 million to litigate.'
A definition of "tax avoidance" that incorporates the
economic substance doctrine is possible because this doctrine is
already used by the Tax Court, and is familiar to corporations.
Although corporate tax shelter cases are fact-intensive and
reliance on a flexible definition of "tax avoidance" might leave
corporations questioning which transactions will be respected for
tax purposes, the IRS's past attempts to curb corporate tax shelters
using detailed rules have not succeeded.'
Therefore, Congress
should codify the economic substance doctrine, but with due
regard for.some of the uncertainties and weaknesses it contains.
As the Treasury's tax legislative counsel, Joseph Mikrut,
stated, "Legislation is needed to require taxpayers to apply
economic-substance principles before the fact, rather than playing
the audit lottery."' Compaq's executives lost the audit lottery and
their corporation was hit with an accuracy-related penalty. The
question now is, after codifying the economic substance doctrine,
how many more corporations will continue to gamble in the audit
lottery, with the jackpot being millions of dollars in reduced
federal taxes?

282.

157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cerL denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).

283. See id. at para. 9 (commenting on the federal government's noneconomic use of resources).
284. See, e.g., Novack & Saunders, supra note 1, at 208 ("[T]he IRS' past
efforts to curb tax shelters with detailed rules haven't slowed down the hustlers
and have often given them openings.").
285. Tom Herman, Tax Report, Wall St. J., Oct. 27,1999, at Al.

